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Abstract 
This paper argues that social policies work towards the subject-making of subaltern 
citizens by defining the grammar of state–subaltern relationship. The Forest Rights Act 
of India (2006) defines the state–adivasi relationship through a two-way process: 
claim-making by the indigenes for forest rights, and reduction of the discourse by the 
state into a politics of recognition without redistribution. While adivasis have employed 
their agency in wresting social policies from the state through protracted struggles, 
they are also made subjects of the state as they go about the Forest Rights Act 
procedure. The paper further points out that adivasi struggles and the organisations 
representing them constitute a distinct adivasi society contra the middle-class civil 
society. Though the spirit of the Act envisages substantive redistribution, the state 
institutions and the monitoring Non-Governmental Organisations have yet to adopt 
redistribution as a core narrative. 
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Introduction 
The indigenous peoples of India or adivasis (original dwellers) form 8.6% of the population 
                                                          
1 This paper draws on the Master’s dissertation work done by the author at the London School of Economics 
during 2012-13. 
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(Census 2011). With a history of marginalisation, they constitute a section of the subaltern, a 
term that was tersely defined by Guha (1982, 8) as ‘the demographic difference between the 
total Indian population and all . . . elite’. They are categorised as Scheduled Tribes (STs) in the 
constitution and given special guarantees such as reservation of seats in public services and 
special funds for education and welfare (Saksena 1981). The state has not recognised the 
adivasis as indigenous peoples, citing their disputed origin (Bose 2013; Shah 2010). The 
Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, constituted in 1951, proposed ‘tribal 
origin, primitive way of life, remote habitation and general backwardness in all respects’ as the 
criterion to determine an ST (Ambagudia 2011, 36). Thus, the state’s view of the adivasis as 
backward has driven its welfare provision for these peoples. Jayal (2013, 266) reiterates the 
same observation, pointing out that backwardness has been a ‘distinctive motif and often the 
authoritative basis for claiming Group-Differentiated Citizenship’. This echoes what Kuper 
(1988) has claimed, that the indigenous could as well be an ‘invention of the primitive’. 
Meanwhile, the benefits and special constitutional protection that the ST status brings has made 
it a sought-after title (Middleton 2013).  
 
Forest Rights Act 2006  
The adivasi political struggles in India have chiefly centred on the rights over land and forests. 
Forests have been a state property from colonial times (Guha 2001), often leading to a refusal 
of the forest-dwelling adivasis’ ownership rights. Recently, this continuing alienation of 
adivasis from their dwelling grounds led to a protracted campaign by various Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to demand a comprehensive law that guaranteed 
ownership. The law was passed in 2006 under the title Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional 
Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, commonly referred to as the Forest Rights 
Act or FRA. Co-written by adivasi activists, the Act explicated in its preamble that it sought to 
correct the ‘historic injustice’ meted out to the Scheduled Tribes and other forest-dependent 
communities (FRA 2006). Essentially, the Act seeks to recognise the right of ownership of an 
adivasi family if it proves that the claimed land belonged to it for three generations (defined as 
75 years) before the cut-off date of 15 December 2005, a year before the Act came into force. 
The onus of proving ownership is on the adivasi family and is to be done through the FRA 
process, wherein proofs including official records as well as symbols, such as trees or shrines, 
are arrayed in an official submission known as a ‘claim’. The FRA process is implemented 
through a decentralised three-tier structure consisting of the Forest Rights Committee (FRC) at 
the lowest level, the Sub-Divisional Level Committee at the intermediate level and the District 
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Level Committee (DLC) at the highest level. The FRC is to be constituted at the level of the 
Gram Sabha or village assembly, where adults of a Gram Panchayat or village council 
assemble. A third of the members must be adivasis and a third women. The claims are verified 
by the FRC and then sent to the higher level bodies for granting Records of Rights. The decision 
of the DLC regarding any complaint is considered final. 
The FRA is significant on four counts. First, it presents a new dynamic in the 
relationship between the Indian state and adivasi citizens insofar as the struggles leading to the 
passage of the Act have compelled the state to relinquish its suzerainty over forestlands, at least 
on paper. The relevance of this new relationship becomes clear when it is considered that many 
projects of the developmental state – mineral extraction, dams and plantations – impact the 
forestlands and could directly be deemed illegal in the wake of the FRA. The projects now need 
to be approved by the Gram Panchayat, thereby proving the FRA to be a watershed in terms of 
local empowerment. Second, the Act recognises not only individual tenure rights, but also 
community rights by guaranteeing the rights to graze cattle, fish and extract Minor Forest 
Produce (MFP) from the forests. The MFPs are non-timber forest products such as bamboo, 
tendu leaves (used for making local cigarettes) and so on that the adivasis depend on for their 
livelihoods. Third, by including the Other Traditional Forest Dwellers, the Act has brought 
nomadic communities that have not yet received the ST status, but are dependent on forests, 
into its umbrella. The Act has thus become a project in expanding the fruits of citizenship. 
Fourth, the Act represents a major step in the expansion of the state’s social policies aimed at 
the welfare of adivasi citizens as it protects not only tenure, but also their livelihoods. I classify 
the FRA as a social policy for these reasons, going by Dean’s (2006) understanding of social 
policy as directly aimed at well-being. 
 
Motifs in social science narratives on adivasis 
The adivasis have attracted passionate research from the disciplines of history (cf. Guha 2007), 
sociology (cf. Nilsen 2013), geography (cf. Corbridge 2002), anthropology (Furer-Haimendorf 
1977; Shah 2007) and political science (cf. Suykens 2009). In this way, each social science has 
subjected the adivasis to its constant ‘gaze’ (on gaze, cf. Ntarangwi 2010).  To understand the 
context in which the FRA gains pertinence, the relationship between the state and the citizen 
as has been shaped historically needs a review. Here, I give a glimpse of this, discerning three 
motifs recurrent in the narratives: subjugation, resistance and governmentality. 
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Subjugation 
Guha and Gadgil (1989) and Gupta (2009) argue that the colonial British government 
controlled the forests in India, denying ownership rights to the adivasis. The Indian Forest Act 
1878 was a chief instrument of subjugation as it legalised state control over forests. The Act, 
was implemented through a well-established bureaucratic system of the Indian Forestry Service 
(Guha 2001). The colonial state took great care in creating records on the adivasis, but the 
process consistently recorded them as backward, thereby inaugurating the perception of the 
indigenes as uncivilised (Bhukya 2008). The state control over forests continued after India 
gained independence from the British in 1947, thereby continuing thehistory of adivasi 
marginalisation. This included the continued advocacy of scientific forestry, which involved 
intensive cultivation of profitable trees for timber and other forest products, mapping of forest 
resources and complete crackdown on shifting agriculture. Indicating the pervasiveness of the 
feeling of subjugation to this day, Baviskar (1994, 2493) recounts in the case of Bhil and 
Bhilala adivasis in the state of Madhya Pradesh that they desperately sought land right 
certificates from the local bureaucrat tehsildar because: 
Such is the power of the state over people’s minds that they crave the legitimacy 
accorded by the government. One scrap of paper, in the usually illegible scrawl of the 
tehsildar, seems to be more real and true than the land and soil itself. 
Saravanan (2011), in a more recent article, enquires the micro-politics of such subjugation in 
the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu between 1990 and 2000, and shows that the totality of 
different government rules and nexus between different government departments work finally 
to subjugate the adivasi citizens. Their access to forests and therefore their livelihoods are 
threatened as a result. Thus, the state–citizen relationship that emerges from these accounts is 
that of adivasis subjugated to the all-powerful state. 
 
Resistance 
While the adivasis have been historically subjugated, they have also periodically retaliated. 
This is important to note as the movement for the FRA could be seen as a continuation of the 
same tradition of adivasi resistance. Noting that such resistance existed as early as colonial 
times, Guha’s (2001, 231) historical recordings suggest that the British exportation of state-
managed forestry to the colonies met with stiff opposition from the adivasis, who ‘responded 
with arson and violence’. Instances include the rebellions in Chota Nagpur (1893), Bastar 
(1910) and Gudam-Rampa (1879–80, 1922–23) (Chattopadhyay 2012). These accounts, 
therefore, offer a contrasting picture to subjugation as the adivasis emerge to be resistant in the 
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wake of suppression. Postcolonial India saw the emergence of a large number of (often 
fragmented) adivasi organisations dealing with the local bureaucrats. For instance, in 1988, the 
Khedut Mazdoor Chetna Sangath led a protracted struggle in Madhya Pradesh, which led to 
the identification of vast hectares of encroachment, locally known as nevad, into adivasi land 
by non-adivasi people (Baviskar 1994). Bhatia (2005) reports from Bihar that the Maoist 
rebellion has gained support amongst the adivasis in the past decades owing to the perception 
of injustice that the adivasis think the Maoists share. The Maoist rebellion had its origins in the 
peasant struggles of 1967 in the little village of Naxalbari in West Bengal and slowly spread to 
the forestlands in other states in eastern and central India, carrying forward its armed struggle 
driven by an extreme leftist ideology (Chandra 2014). The military crackdown of the rebellion 
by the state has often turned violent, trapping the adivasis in between (Hariss 2011). The 
ethnographies of Shah (2006) and Miklian (2009) suggest that the Maoist resistance is not 
always committed to people and significant linkages between the Maoists and the state could 
be observed on ground. The FRA gains pertinence again as it was championed by democratic 
adivasi organisations largely unconnected to the Maoist rebellion. Kumar (2014) points out 
that democratic adivasi groups as well as their sympathisers can form assemblages to fight 
against state injustice and corporate actors, as seen in the resistance of the adivasis in the state 
of Odisha against bauxite mining in the hills that they considered sacred. At the same time, it 
is important to note that not all democratic adivasi movements achieve their goals. For instance, 
Basu (2012, 1294) notes that in the state of Jharkhand, the resistance movement to carve out a 
separate Jharkhand state with a distinct Adivasi identity did not succeed in promoting the 
welfare of the adivasis as the Jharkhandi movement was ‘de-radicalised as a result of 
systematic appropriation, manipulation and contestation of discourses on collective identity 
and development between rival political factions and the state’. Therefore, fragmentation of 
the democratic struggles, often perpetuated by the mainstream political parties, is a major 
constraint that adivasi politics faces. 
 
Governmentality 
Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality has enchanted researchers as a theoretical 
explanation for state control over its subjects. Governmentality is understood as the 
mechanisms through which the government disciplines the population just as the population 
imbibes these rules (Elden 2007). For instance, Middleton (2013, 14) points out from his field 
notes in Darjeeling, east India, that the government anthropologists, who identify the adivasi 
communities eligible for the ST status, constitute elements of an ‘ethnological 
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governmentality’. In another instance, Agrawal (2005) fuses environmental governance and 
governmentality into a new concept ‘environmentality’ to refer to the disciplining of the forest-
dependent communities through state policies on forest management. Bose (2012) then adopts 
this framework to offer her analysis of the Adivasi struggles for secure tenure, including the 
politics surrounding the FRA. Bose points out that adivasi subjects have been historically 
subjected to state disciplining and that the FRA can also become a means of governmentality 
or centralised control of forests. The use of governmentality in the analysis of the FRA should 
be seen with caution, particularly when it is noted that affiliation to certain theoretical ideas 
can get reiterated through citations and re-citations (Hemmings 2011). Unlike the forest laws 
that subjugated the adivasis, the FRA cannot be seen as an instrument of governmentality, 
owing to the collective mobilisation of adivasis that went behind it. These collective struggles 
saw the adivasis expressing their agency, making them exception to what Foucault calls as 
‘subject of needs, but object in the hands of the government’ (Faubion 1994, 12). 
 
Social policies for adivasis and subject-making 
Since independence, a large number of social policies have been devised targeting the 
adivasis. The constitutional recognition of adivasis as STs, creation of scheduled areas under 
the fifth and sixth schedules of the constitution with special measures for the protection of the 
adivasi inhabitants therein, and affirmative action in the form of reservation of seats in public 
employment can be seen as some of the early moments in the moulding of their social 
citizenship (Varghese 2002). The extension of state-sponsored welfare to adivasis has been a 
staple feature of all five year plans. For instance, the fourth plan constituted the Tribal 
Development Agencies in regions where adivasis were in utter poverty, though the bureaucrats 
largely failed in their mission (Varghese 2002). Also noteworthy is the Tribal Sub-Plan that 
was initiated in the fifth five year plan (1974–1979) and aimed at integrating the adivasis with 
the mainstream society, though with little success (Saravanan 2009). While these plans brought 
some infrastructural facilities to remote adivasi areas, the living conditions of adivasis only 
worsened in subsequent years as the plans failed in bringing them out of poverty or providing 
land to the landless. Though the Sub-Plans were complemented with additional measures, such 
as the Minimum Needs Programme (sixth plan) and Primitive Tribe Development Plan (eighth 
plan) in the subsequent plans, these too could not eliminate poverty or landlessness amongst 
adivasis. Further, the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996 or PESA sought to 
extend the fruits of participatory democracy and decentralised governance, initiated in the rest 
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of the country in 1993, to the adivasi areas. PESA mandated that elected local bodies be formed 
at the village level in the scheduled areas with at least half of the members as well as the 
chairperson belonging to STs. Though the Act also stipulated that the village council be 
‘endowed’ with the ownership of MFP, this did not materialise in the years that followed.  
Thus, many of the crucial postcolonial moments that consolidated the social citizenship 
of adivasis failed in bringing about substantive changes in the lives of adivasis. Nevertheless, 
the concept of social citizenship still holds pertinence as seen in the demand for the FRA. In 
fact, the concept of social citizenship itself has come a long way since T. H. Marshall proposed 
the idea in his essay Citizenship and Social Class (1950). The Indian democracy constitutes 
what Marshall called the ‘hyphenated society’ – a coexistence of democratic institutions, 
capitalist economy and welfare state. The citizen is placed at the crossroads of these sites. 
Although Marshall addressed his ideas chiefly to the Western society, his notion of social right 
as the right to enjoy ‘a modicum of civilized life’ has attracted wide currency (Turner 2009). 
For instance, Varela (2008) opines that a prominent resurgence of the idea could be seen in 
Amartya Sen’s works, in which social citizenship is connected to dignity, integrity, autonomy 
and capabilities (Sen 1999, 2004). The capabilities of affiliation, other species and control over 
one’s environment as proposed by Nussbaum (2006) directly relate to the life of adivasis and 
the political struggles that went behind the FRA. Seen in this light, the FRA can be seen as 
another step in the continuing history of adivasis negotiating social citizenship with the state. 
 
Adivasis as interpellated citizens  
Sundar (2011, 419) points out that the rule of law is given substantive, rather than a ‘thin 
procedural’, meaning by citizenship struggles, especially in postcolonial societies like India, 
which inherited ‘colonial law designed for subjecthood rather than citizenship’. I take up the 
case of FRA to check if it deepens citizenship or locks adivasi citizens in unrewarded 
subjection. The state is central to the whole analysis as it has actively created the categories of 
citizenship; in this case, the STs. A defining moment in the history of this process was the 
drafting of the constitution of independent India by the Constituent Assembly, where these 
categories were contested. The Chairman Dr B. R. Ambedkar, in response to a query raised in 
the Assembly regarding the definition of backward communities, had to say that they were 
simply those groups considered as backward in the government’s opinion (NCSCST 1998, 
author’s italics). Here, we get the first glimpse of adivasis becoming what Althusser ([1971] 
2008) referred to as the ‘always already interpellated’ subjects.  
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Althusser called the process of subject-making of citizens as interpellation. He points 
out that ‘the State has no meaning except as a function of State power. The whole of the 
political class struggle revolves around the State’ (([1971] 2008), 14). His example is the case 
of a policeman hailing a citizen by shouting ‘hey you!’ on the streets. The citizen responds to 
the policeman in a reflex, recognising that she/he was the one who was called. She/he thereby 
participates in the process of subject-making by law, represented by the police. The subject is 
thus ‘always already interpellated’, Althusser points out (([1971] 2008), 44). He breaks away 
from the notion that the state is always manifested in Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs) 
such as the administration, police, army, courts, etc. that function to subjectify citizens through 
one or the other form of repression or violence. Althusser proposes the concept of Ideological 
State Apparatuses (ISAs) through which state ideas is transmitted to citizens. Examples include 
schools, legal and political systems, trade unions, communications, and religious institutions 
and family. I argue that social policy can function as an ISA, especially in its implementation, 
as it shapes the grammar of state–subject relations. Althusser cautions that while RSAs function 
predominantly through violence and ISAs predominantly through ideology, it is important to 
note that in reality they function through both means. Thus, social policies can possibly have 
repressive elements.  
While referring to Althusser, I am conscious that the idea belongs to Marxist 
structuralism, a school which believes that the state reproduces conditions conducive to 
capitalism through its legal, political and economic structures. Althusserian structuralists have 
been criticised for a refusal to test their knowledge claims based on results from research, going 
by Althusser’s claim that knowledge is an ‘intellectual construct’ (Vaillancourt 1986). The 
methodology that I adopt breaks away from this notion and presents evidence from empirical 
studies, in order to analyse how the subject-making of adivasi citizens in India occurs. The 
analysis of the FRA shows that its implementation shows a repressive face of the state with 
regard to its dilution into a scheme of giving out tokenistic land titles. 
As noted before, the FRA chiefly functions through the granting of land titles for which 
requests called as ‘claims’ are submitted before the FRC at the neighbourhood level in a village 
council. This is the grassroots interface at which the adivasi citizens participate in the process 
of interpellation, wherein claim-making initiates the process of becoming complete citizens or 
subjects of the state. The statistics kept by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs show that as of 31 
May 2014, the number of claims recorded since the Act came into force was 3,764,315 (MoTA 
2014). But only 1,436,290 (38%) have been actually distributed seven years since the Act came 
into force in 2006. These national-level figures give the first warning signal that the FRA, 
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which was brought in to correct the ‘historic injustice’ against adivasis, could become another 
token gesture with repressive elements. Table 1 presents evidence on the number of claims 
despatched from five states with major FRA struggles to elaborate the foregoing point. As 
revealed by the data, none of the states have granted rights to all the claims that were submitted. 
The maximum distribution is found in Orissa, where 59.1% of the total claims led to final 
distribution of titles. The Ministry of Tribal Affairs doesn’t maintain the DLCs’ minutes to 
explain the reasons forthe rejection of the claims. In addition, the distribution of community 
claims has been abysmally low. Even if we accept that the individual claims might have been 
rejected due to lack of proofs, the same explanation cannot be extended to community claims 
as they are held in common by the entire adivasi community for the purposes of fishing, grazing 
and collection of MFP. The reluctance of the forest department to relinquish rights over 
community forestlands emerges, then, as a plausible explanation, pointing out the mode 
through which repressive elements sneak into egalitarian social policies.  
 
Table 1: Number of Claims Despatched in Five States with Major FRA Struggles 
State No. of Claims Received No. of Titles Distributed Percentage of Titles Distributed 
Bihar Total: 2930 28 0.95 
Chhattisgarh Total: 756,052 312,250 41 
Jharkhand Total: 42,003 15,296 36 
Madhya Pradesh Total: 516,189 187,392 36.3 
Individual: 341,085 101,426 29.7 
Community: 27,691 12,256 44.25 
Orissa Total: 563,154 333,001 59.1 
Individual: 551,109 329,805 59.8 
Community: 12,045 3196 26.5 
Source: MoTA (2014) 
 
While the ‘participatory process’ of claim-submission calls on the adivasi citizens to 
access the law, the subsequent stages of surveying and mapping the land claimed are 
monopolised by the forest officials (Chemmencheri 2013). Thus, the adivasis do not get to 
know what transpires between claim-submission and its acceptance or rejection by the higher 
level committees. The whole process thus serves as an ISA that ‘hails’ the citizens to appear 
before the state, but subtly proves to be repressive by creating ignorance regarding the scientific 
mapping process and final decisions made – stages that get captured by elite forest officials.  
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Althusser’s concepts are distinctly useful in the analysis of subaltern struggles for the 
following reasons. First, the elite capture of state apparatuses is acknowledged within his ideas, 
wherein the ruling class that exploitsRSAs is also noted to be likely to exploit the ISAs. Second, 
the subjects undergoing interpellation also participate in subject-making by engaging with the 
state, or asAlthusser (([1971] 2008), 44) has pointed out, ‘there is no ideology except by the 
subject and for subjects’. In the process, it actually makes the citizen as seen in the making of 
the adivasis as the category STs and the parallel claiming of this status by the adivasis. Povinelli 
(2002) notes from her ethnographic work with the aborigines of Australia that the liberal 
nation-state expects the aborigines to not assimilate and instead remain stuck to an ‘impossible 
authenticity’ that does not factor the history of colonisation. The subjects in adivasis would 
have faced a similar situation had not the FRA noted the injustice they experienced in colonial 
and postcolonial times and explicitly sought to reverse it. 
Further, as Edwards (2007) has pointed out, interpellated citizenship doesn’t mean that 
the citizens are passive. They can instead own the agency to dissent. Thus, when Adivasi 
organisations fought for the passage of FRA in the parliament, they were displaying dissent, 
thereby laying the conditions of their own subject-making. Therefore, this framework allows 
for the consideration of the subaltern’s own voice (Remotely, this addresses Spivak’s ([1988] 
2010) concern in the classic essay Can the Subaltern Speak? that Western theoretical corpuses 
tend to speak for the subaltern rather than listening to their voice). 
 
 
Conceptualising an adivasi society 
It was noted earlier that the forest department has shown persistent reluctance in granting 
access rights, especially with regard to community titles. This is further evident in the series of 
court cases brought against the FRA. Interestingly, the case Bombay Natural History Society 
versus Union of India and Others 2008 (CSD 2013) recognised that restoration of tribal lands 
that have been alienated remains a problem. But the petitioners went on to say that the Act 
must be struck down as it did not aim towards that end. In the case Wildlife First versus the 
Union of India and Others (CSD 2013), the petitioners claimed that the ownership of 
forestlands given to the adivasis under the FRA stood in violation of the Wildlife Protection 
Act 1972 as the former threatened wildlife by granting unfettered access to the adivasis. 
However, hunting has been actually prohibited under the FRA. Here we see a clear clash 
between the metropolitan civil society organisations (CSOs) and the adivasi struggles. The 
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CSOs, while pushing their legitimate concern over environmental destruction, fail to see that 
the adivasis could be equal partners in conserving the forest. This is not to create a new 
‘development myth’ (cf. Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007) that all communities are 
protectors of forests, but to point out that granting community titles can help the adivasis check 
overgrazing or overexploitation of forest resources and become efficient managers of the 
commons.  
The opposition between the civil society organisations and adivasi struggles calls for a 
deeper analysis of the public sphere movements and how they relate to the state. The FRA is 
distinct in the sense that it was the result of a protracted struggle by adivasi organisations across 
the country (Kumar and Kerr 2012). Thus, the adivasis consciously participated in this process 
rather than being passive subjects. But does this mean, as Butler (1995) points out, that citizens 
participate in the process of interpellation out of a temptation in their conscience to be a part 
of law, while knowing that it would lead to their subject-making? The answer would be 
partially yes and partially no. The lure of the benefits of the FRA are undeniable as they provide 
welfare and security to lives by securing tenure and access to MFP for livelihoods. At the same 
time, the rallying of adivasis against the state, which had controlled forests for centuries, shows 
that the motive was to reclaim ownership over their dwelling grounds, rather than be ‘seen’ by 
the state, to allude to Scott’s notion of the state ‘seeing’ its citizens (Scott 1998). 
Chatterjee (2008) has pointed out that the democratic public sphere in India post the 
economic liberalisation of 1991 has two discernible realms: the civil society and the political 
society. The former is constituted by the bourgeois middle class, which taps into and benefits 
from the neoliberal economy in terms of jobs and upward social mobility. They participate in 
elections and adhere to the rule of law. Meanwhile, the large informal sector in the country, 
which remains outside the rule of law and depends on welfare, constitutes the political society 
(Chatterjee 2011). Although Chatterjee doesn’t justify the nomenclature of this realm, he notes 
that it makes claims on the state alongside the civil society, thanks to the electoral politics of 
the country. But adivasis, he notes, are excluded from the political society. Their small numbers 
mean that they do not matter much in electoral politics. I contend that the adivasis, NGOs as 
well as the numerous unregistered forums working for adivasi rights constitute an adivasi 
society, to coin a simple term following Chatterjee’s framework. The adivasi society does not 
function in isolation, however, and is establishing crucial links with the civil and political 
society organisations.They have come under umbrella campaigns such as the Narmada Bachao 
Andolan, Campaign for Survival and Dignity and Ekta Parishad. CSOs like the People’s Union 
for Civil Liberties (PUCL 2010) have maintained close contact with the adivasi society, 
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running regular features in their bulletins on the implementation of the FRA. Another CSO, the 
Liberty Institute New Delhi, which works on the principles of liberty and right to property, has 
emerged as another principal supporter of adivasi struggles for forest rights (LI 2013). This 
organisation has articulated the adivasi struggles for forest rights using the liberal ideology of 
property rights. These partnerships mean that adivasis are actively building alliances and 
expanding them. The process of interpellation is thus rendered twoway, with the adivasis 
wresting their share from the state, at the same time that the state makes subjects of them. I 
now proceed to analyse if these efforts have actually proved to be transformative and geared 
towards redistribution. 
 
The politics of recognition versus redistribution in the FRA 
While using Althusser’s ideas to outline subject-making, I admit its origins in continental 
philosophy, which has had its own share of critics. Nussbaum (1999), for instance, criticised 
this school as too abstract to be useful for activism. Applying caution, I expand my ideas using 
the notions of recognition versus redistribution. Explaining how social and political struggles 
today have become confined to a struggle for recognition rather than redistribution, Fraser 
(1997) notes in her book Justice Interruptus that these struggles have been reduced to an 
assertion of identity based on nationality, ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, etc. The 
consequence is the obliteration of struggles for socioeconomic redistribution (Fraser 2000). 
Recognition would involve revaluation of identities that have lacked the desired status. By 
redistribution is meant substantive political-economic restructuring, involving redistribution of 
income, changes in labour relations and transforming the economic structures. Fraser opines 
that the former has overshadowed the latter in today’s world, although both kinds of injustices 
are still pervasive. Fraser employs caution in distinguishing between the two, noting that the 
distinction is analytical, as there are significant overlaps between the two. 
It can be easily seen that the adivasis, owing to their historical marginalisation and 
alienation from forestlands, need both recognition as well as redistribution. In the context of 
the FRA, by redistribution I mean bringing up the material status of adivasis by ensuring the 
security of the titles they claim, and not just awarding tokenistic pieces of lands to landless 
adivasis. Evidence from the implementation of the FRA shows that even when adivasis 
succeeded in getting their claims over lands recognised, the area of the land for which they 
received ownership was much smaller than the area they claimed ownership for. While the Act 
prescribes recognition of up to two hectares, Sarker (2011) points out that on average at the 
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national level, only half an acre (1 hectare ¼ 2.5 acre) has been distributed. This shows that 
while the adivasi society has launched protracted struggles to make claims on the state, the 
state still holds considerable power as manifested in reducing the politics of redistribution 
entailed in the spirit behind the FRA, to a politics of mere recognition. This is also evident in 
the state monopolisation of the MFP, which the adivasis depend on for their livelihoods. While 
the FRA proposes complete right of access to MFP for the adivasis, this has not been uniformly 
applied in all the states, chiefly with regard to bamboo and tendu leaves (Sambhav 2013). In a 
Poverty Impact Assessment conducted by the European Union State Partnership Programme 
with the state of Chhattisgarh, FRA has been called an important piece of legislation that would 
protect livelihoods and reduce poverty by giving the adivasis the right to own and sell MFP 
(Gebert, Namala, and Kumar 2011). But access to these forest products remains a far cry as the 
state continues to determine which of these are granted accessibility.  
At this point, it needs to be noted that the campaigns behind the demand for FRA chiefly 
focused on the state oppression of adivasis and their landedness, and not exactly on their 
recognition as culturally distinctive indigenes, though the indigenous nature of adivasis was 
implicit in the demands (Kumar and Kerr 2012). When the FRA was enacted, activists and 
adivasi rights leaders hailed the law as a new era in the efforts towards substantive justice, or 
to employ Fraserian terms, redistribution. Indeed, the Act could have bridged the divide 
between recognition and redistribution. The reality of FRA implementation has, however,made 
this difficult. The adivasi rights organisations have been at the forefront of pointing out the 
limited success that the FRA has seen in its implementation, but have still limited their 
narratives to recognition, omitting redistribution. Independent reports published by these 
organisations give a glimpse of this. The Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, based 
in New Delhi, produced a report funded by the European Commission in early 2012 accusing 
the FRA of ‘perpetuating the historical injustices’ (AITPN 2012, 1). The dominant voice 
throughout the paper is, however, that of a demand for recognition. Transformative 
redistribution has yet to receive a place in the NGO lexicon. Similarly, the report on the status 
of FRA published by the NGOs Natural Justice (Bangalore) and Kalpavriksh (Pune and Delhi), 
explaining the provisions of the Act, adopts a language of recognition (Broome et al. 2012). 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature, meanwhile, lauds the adivasi efforts to 
have the FRA passed, but construes the FRA as a new conservation strategy rather than as a 
means to ensure substantive ownership rights to the people (IUCN 2010). A national 
consultation held with NGOs working for the FRA conducted by Vasundhara (Bhubaneswar) 
and Kalpavriksh (Pune), and supported by Oxfam, reports that the guidelines to implement the 
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Act in the state of Chhattisgarh were distorted and claims were to be submitted to the head of 
the Village Panchayat instead of the newly constituted FRCs (Vasundhara-Kalpavriksh 2013a). 
These organisations reiterate the urgent need to recognise the rights of the adivasis without 
delving deeper into the size of lands over which people received ownership in comparison to 
what they claimed ownership for (Vasundhara-Kalpavriksh 2013b). 
The central government launched the Integrated Action Plan in 2010 in 82 districts of 
central India to deal with the Maoist rebellion (PIB 2012). The Plan contains a host of policies 
aimed at infrastructure creation and employment training for the adivasis in a bid to deflect 
them away from the Maoists and attract them towards the state. Curiously, the FRA has been 
made a constituent policy of the Plan. The motive behind the implementation of the Act in 
these districts has thus been reduced to curbing insurgency. Thus, the state persists as central 
to defining the grammar of its relationship with subaltern citizens, save a few isolated 
exceptions. For instance, the Grama Sabha of Trilochanpur Panchayat in Orissa adopted a 
unanimous resolution banning the multinational company Vedanta from mining bauxite in their 
sacred mountains invoking their rights over forestlands as enshrined in the FRA (‘Third Gram 
Sabha Too Rejects Mining in Niyamgiri’, The Hindu, July 24, 2013). The mining company 
had received permission to mine from the state government as part of the state’s agenda of 
promoting industrial development. The citizenship negotiations between the adivasis and the 
state, therefore, continue. 
 
 
Conclusion 
As a social policy measure aimed at securing the tenure and livelihoods of adivasis, the 
FRA has expanded the social policy measures extended towards the adivasis. The FRA process 
interpellates the subaltern subject by hailing them to make claims and receive titles, which 
attribute to them a status of full social citizenship. The specifics of interpellation by the law 
shows that the state still holds sway in deciding the politics of the process by reducing it to 
recognition rather than substantive redistribution aimed at correcting the historic injustice that 
the adivasis have experienced. This was evident in the granting of lands much smaller in size 
than prescribed in the Act as well as in the poor record of granting community rights and access 
to MFP. The result has been a minimalist conversation between the state and its subaltern 
subjects. The organisations working for adivasi rights have been key stakeholders in the whole 
discourse as they have brought out how the state has used the social policy measure to shape 
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its relationship with the Adivasi subjects. In the process, however, they too have missed the 
need to push for transformative redistribution. The importance of adopting redistribution as a 
core narrative gains particular importance in the wake of the adivasi society’s segregation from 
the civil and political societies, as well as the opportunities of electoral politics. 
Overall, the analysis showed that the FRA has shaped the subject-making of the 
country’s indigenous peoples or adivasis through a two-way process: claim-making by the 
adivasis for forest rights, and reduction of the discourse by the state into a politics of 
recognition without redistribution. The FRA, nevertheless, has opened a new chapter in the 
political theatre of forests by animating new modes through which the state and the subaltern 
see each other. Standing at the crossroads of democratic institutions, neoliberal economy and 
welfare programmes, the adivasi is making new bargains with the state based on rights, along 
with the process of their own subject-making by the state. 
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